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PASSIONATE REASON: KIERKEGAARD AND 
PLANTINGA ON RADICAL CONVERSION
Richard Otte
It is reasonable to take Kierkegaard and Plantinga as presenting very differ-
ent approaches to the rationality of adopting religious beliefs. Kierkegaard 
says Christian doctrines are absurd, and Plantinga argues that the existence 
of God is part of the deliverances of reason. I argue that in spite of these ap-
parent differences, Kierkegaard and Plantinga agree on some foundational 
epistemological issues. I begin by exploring the topic of radical conversion, as 
discussed by van Fraassen. I use the notion of radical conversion as a tool, to 
focus our investigation and illuminate the agreements between Kierkegaard 
and Plantinga. Because of the role of passions and affections in epistemol-
ogy, we will see that Kierkegaard and Plantinga share a basic epistemological 
outlook.
When one thinks of philosophers of religion, Soren Kierkegaard and 
Alvin Plantinga represent two very different points of view. Kierkegaard 
is often regarded as one of the fathers of existentialism and continental 
philosophy, and Plantinga revolutionized analytic philosophy of religion. 
Continental thinkers approvingly quote Kierkegaard, but he is seldom 
referred to by analytic philosophers. Plantinga is one of the most influ-
ential analytic philosophers, cited by many, but it would be unusual to 
find continental philosophers discussing his works. Because of this, one 
common view might be not that Kierkegaard and Plantinga really dis-
agree, but that their ideas are incommensurable in some sense. The idea 
here would be that they are talking about very different things using very 
different concepts, and their ideas have little to do with each other. Al-
though some have suggested that Plantinga is really a fideist, it is fair to 
say that most take Kierkegaard and Plantinga to be at opposing ends of 
the philosophical spectrum when it comes to epistemology and the ratio-
nality of religious beliefs. Plantinga argues that belief in God’s existence is 
part of the deliverances of reason, whereas Kierkegaard is well-known for 
saying religious belief is absurd. These philosophers are held to be about 
as different as philosophers can get.
In what follows I will argue that this common view is mistaken; deep 
down, we find Kierkegaard and Plantinga share a common basic epis-
temological outlook. Although they appear to have very different views 
about reason and religious belief, this is illusory. There is deep agreement 
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between them, in spite of apparent differences. To see the agreement 
between Kierkegaard and Plantinga, we will begin by exploring the philo-
sophical problem of radical conversion in philosophy of science, as it is 
developed by Bas van Fraassen. I will use the notion of radical conversion 
as a tool to help focus our investigation and bring to light some ideas held 
by both Kierkegaard and Plantinga. The problem of radical conversion 
arises for many epistemological positions, but there are good reasons to 
think some cases of radical conversion are rational. We will then look at 
rationality and radical conversion from the perspective of Kierkegaard’s 
Johannes Climacus in the Philosophical Crumbs.1 There are many ways to 
interpret Kierkegaard’s writings, and in this article I will ignore most of 
these debates. I will simply assume one plausible interpretation of Kier-
kegaard’s Johannes Climacus, one argued for by Stephen Evans, even 
though I am aware that other commentators may disagree. Thus my posi-
tion might be more accurately described as claiming that one plausible 
way of reading Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Crumbs results in Johannes 
Climacus and Plantinga having very similar basic epistemologies.2 We 
will then discuss the rationality of religious belief according to Plantinga. 
We will look at a seldom discussed chapter in Plantinga’s Warranted Chris-
tian Belief, in which he investigates the role of the affections and reason. A 
central topic in our investigation will be the role of the passions in episte-
mology, and we will see that Kierkegaard and Plantinga have much more 
in common than is usually thought when it comes to the epistemology of 
religious belief.
Radical Conversion
Often we change our beliefs in ways that result in our new beliefs being 
very different from what we previously held. Perhaps we acquire some 
new evidence and in response we completely change our way of thinking; 
if the change is significant enough, we consider these to be examples of 
conversion. For example, Antony Flew claims he changed his beliefs and 
became a theist on the basis of evidence.3 Let us call cases in which rea-
soning about evidence produces a significant and important change of 
belief “ordinary conversion.” Attempts at providing evidence for religious 
belief are attempts at bringing about ordinary conversion. It is important 
to see that cases of ordinary conversion are considered rational from the 
1“Philosophical Crumbs” is a translation of Kierkegaard’s “Philosophiske Smuler,” 
which has often been translated as “Philosophical Fragments.” Philosophical Crumbs and 
Philosophical Fragments are the same work by Kierkegaard.
2For further discussion of similarities between Kierkegaard and Plantinga, see Stephen 
Evans, “Externalist Epistemology, Subjectivity, and Christian Knowledge: Plantinga and 
Kierkegaard,” in Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2006), 
183–205, and Stephen Evans, “Kierkegaard and Plantinga on Belief in God: Subjectivity as 
the Ground of Properly Basic Religious Beliefs,” in Kierkegaard on Faith and the Self (Waco, TX: 
Baylor University Press, 2006), 169–182. 
3Antony Flew and Roy A. Varghese, There is a God: How the World’s Most Notorious Atheist 
Changed His Mind (New York: HarperOne, 2007). 
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perspective of the previous beliefs, once the new evidence is taken into 
account; the change from the old to the new beliefs was rational because 
it was based on one’s epistemic principles and acquired evidence. In ad-
vance of the conversion, one could say that if I came to have such and such 
evidence, then I would change to the new beliefs; when I get the evidence, 
the new beliefs follow simply from one’s old beliefs, the new evidence, 
and the epistemic principles one accepts. From the point of view of the 
prior beliefs, there is nothing irrational about this change, even though the 
beliefs may change in significant ways.
There are, however, cases of conversion that are more difficult to 
account for. In ordinary conversion the person will consider the change ra-
tional, because the change is a result of the beliefs and epistemic principles 
one holds, as well as the new evidence. But there are cases of conversion 
in which the new beliefs cannot be seen as following from one’s beliefs, 
epistemic principles, and evidence. In some conversion cases, from the 
prior perspective the new beliefs are not arrived at rationally from the 
prior beliefs and the new beliefs appear irrational or absurd. From the 
prior perspective, there does not seem to be any way to move from the 
earlier beliefs to the later beliefs in a rational way. However, from the 
posterior perspective, the change from the prior to the posterior beliefs 
was completely rational. This is a very puzzling situation. We could, of 
course, simply declare that all such cases are irrational, but that would be 
too hasty, and simply ignores the accounts of those who have had these 
conversion experiences. Bas van Fraassen clearly describes the situation:
The problem is simple to state. Imagine yourself looking back to your past 
self, or to our communal past. Say: I can now understand quite well how I 
thought at that time, but I see that by those earlier lights what I now think 
makes no sense at all. How was it possible for me to go through that fortu-
nate change? That I now see it as fortunate and vindicated does not at all 
mean that it was rational, reasonable, or rationally acceptable at the time. 
So should I applaud bursts or binges of irrationality as acceptable crisis re-
sponse? Should I glory in having done precisely what I would now forbid 
myself in the name of Reason? Should I give up my commitment to ratio-
nal management of opinion, since I now applaud that previous unratifiable 
change of mind? Or am I just mistaken to think my present views were ab-
surd or unintelligible then? Is the whole idea of radical conversion, of true 
revolutions in scientific thought or elsewhere, an illusion?4
Let us call conversions in which the later beliefs are not permitted by the 
prior beliefs and new evidence “radical conversion.” Radical conversions 
in which according to the prior view there is no possible evidence (evi-
dence assigned a non-zero probability by the prior view) that would allow 
a rational change to the posterior view, we will call “extreme conversion.” 
Extreme conversion is just a special case of radical conversion; in radical 
conversion none of the actual evidence justifies the change to the posterior 
4Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002), 72.
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beliefs, and according to extreme conversion there is no possible evidence 
that justifies the change. The idea, common to both radical and extreme 
conversion, is that from the perspective of the old beliefs the new beliefs 
are not a proper response given new evidence, but according to the new 
beliefs the change was a good response to the evidence. The challenge will 
be to give an account whereby cases of radical and extreme conversion 
can be rational. Radical conversion can arise whenever one’s prior beliefs 
place restrictions on responses to evidence. Epistemologies in which fu-
ture beliefs are a function of or are limited by rules that apply to old beliefs 
and evidence will have difficulties accounting for radical conversion, since 
the new beliefs violate the rules in cases of radical conversion.
In The Empirical Stance van Fraassen discusses radical conversion in the 
context of scientific revolutions, as described by Feyerabend and Kuhn. 
One characteristic of a scientific revolution is that a completely new way 
of thinking about issues is adopted, a way that is not reasonable by the 
lights of the previous theory. As Kuhn emphasized, the difference in 
paradigms is not due to some additional evidence, and there is no way to 
reason from the previous paradigm to the new paradigm using evidence. 
Yet those who come to adopt the new paradigm see this belief change as 
rational. What the old paradigm regards as improper or unreasonable, 
the new paradigm sees as an epistemically superior way to account for 
the evidence. Thus described, scientific revolutions are clear examples of 
radical conversion, and it would be extreme to deny that they exist or that 
they are rational. van Fraassen writes:
Yes, there are such changes, so radical that they are characterized by a re-
markable historical asymmetry. From the posterior point of view, the prior 
can be made intelligible and the change ratified. From the prior position, 
however, the posterior view was absurd and the transition to it possible but 
incapable of justification. Taken together, these two points may seem less an 
answer than a paradox.5
Scientific revolutions raise the puzzle of radical conversion: how can the 
belief change be seen to be rational in retrospect, even though prior to the 
change it would be viewed as irrational?
Although the puzzle of radical conversion is intuitively clear, if we 
wanted we could give a more formal description of it within the frame-
work of traditional Bayesianism, in which belief is changed in accordance 
with conditionalization. Suppose we have a Bayesian agent with a prior 
probability function on a language such that for all possible evidence 
statements in the language, it is not the case that conditionalizing on 
some or all of that evidence will result in some proposition H having 
a high probability. In other words, there is no way to get to a posterior 
probability function in which H is assigned a high probability by condi-
tionalizing on evidence. Suppose the agent changes belief by assigning 
5van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, 65.
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H a high probability, and furthermore considers that change rational; 
this describes a case of extreme conversion, because there is no possible 
evidence for the prior probability function to conditionalize on and get 
the posterior probability function. An agent using orthodox Bayesianism 
to manage beliefs will consider any change of belief that assigns H high 
probability irrational, even if the belief change were considered rational 
from the resulting later point of view. A Bayesian managing beliefs will 
consider certain belief change improper, but after the change the belief 
change may be seen as a good response to the evidence even though it 
violated the deeply held epistemic principles at the time. The question is 
how it can be rational to violate one’s deeply held epistemic views.
We do not need to appeal to philosophy of science or Bayesianism in 
order to describe cases of radical conversion; it is easy to find examples 
in ordinary life. Suppose we have a naturalist who holds all belief change 
must be based on sufficient evidence. She has views about what constitutes 
sufficient evidence and beliefs about what are proper and improper re-
sponses to evidence. She also has thought about the possibility of religious 
experience, but holds that religious experience is a result of cognitive pro-
cesses that are unreliable and thus provides no basis for religious beliefs. 
Thinking about what to believe if she were to have a religious experience, 
she says that she has thought about possible types of religious experi-
ence, but holds they are illusory. Thus she believes she should remain a 
naturalist, even if she were to have a religious experience; she holds that it 
would be epistemically improper for her to become a theist on the basis of 
religious experience. Now suppose that she has a religious experience of 
the sort she has considered, and comes to believe that she was previously 
in error about these experiences being unreliable; she thus changes her 
beliefs and becomes a theist. This is a case of radical conversion; her prior 
views do not allow her to take her religious experience as veridical and 
become a theist. However, from the point of view of her posterior beliefs, 
the change in belief was completely rational; she was correcting an error 
in her previous beliefs. According to her previous views on evidential 
support, religious experience provides no support for religious beliefs. 
But her later views on evidential relations allow religious experience to 
support religious belief. The puzzle is to account for the later claim that 
the change was rational, even though it appears irrational from the prior 
point of view.
One way cases of radical conversion can arise is when the epistemic 
principles used in managing beliefs exclude certain responses to experi-
ence. The epistemic import of having an experience can be very different 
from the epistemic import of thinking about the experience, and having 
the experience and imagining myself having the experience can have very 
different epistemic consequences. Without having a certain experience, I 
may truly believe that the experience would not be veridical, but after 
having the experience I may realize that my previous views were wrong. I 
hadn’t had the experience, was unfamiliar with it, and my epistemic views 
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about it were from an impoverished epistemic position. Thus it can be ra-
tional to respond to an experience differently from what I earlier thought 
would be rational. Sometimes we undergo radical conversion because we 
respond to experience in ways we previously ruled irrational; we consider 
this response rational because we now hold that our previous views were 
in error.
It is important to distinguish cases of radical conversion from cases in 
which we would not be inclined to say the belief change was rational. For 
example, someone may ingest a drug knowing that it results in beliefs 
known to be false.6 In cases such as this, some may claim the person is no 
longer themselves; they have lost control over their beliefs. How to handle 
such cases is controversial, but cases of radical conversion need not be 
cases like this. In radical conversion the person has not lost control of their 
beliefs or ceased to be the same epistemic agent. The problem is how to ac-
count for rational beings adopting views that they previously considered 
irrational to adopt.
To understand the concept of radical conversion, it may be helpful to 
look at the epistemic project of managing one’s beliefs. Although there are 
many epistemic projects, one important project is that of responsibly and 
rationally managing our beliefs, including belief change. In managing our 
beliefs, we make use of beliefs we have about evidence and about what are 
proper and improper ways to change belief. Because of this, gaining some 
specific evidence and changing certain beliefs may be radical conversion 
for some and ordinary conversion for others, depending on other views 
about how to manage belief. For example, suppose one holds that seeming 
right is always sufficient evidence for a belief. For this person, it may 
not be possible to have a radical conversion; any change to a belief that 
seems right from the later perspective will be acceptable from the prior 
perspective. Now consider an orthodox Bayesian who accepts the require-
ment of conditionalization. Evidence learned is assigned a probability of 
1, but beliefs of degree 1 or 0 cannot be changed by conditionalization. 
Thus any evidence belief or any other belief of degree 1 or 0 can never be 
changed. For such a person, the possibility of radical conversion looms 
large, because we often do change beliefs we were certain of. To deter-
mine whether a change of belief is radical conversion, we must not do 
so from the perspective of our epistemic situation, but we must consider 
the beliefs, epistemic principles, and evidence as it is understood by the 
person. From our perspective a person may not fully grasp some evidence 
or understand the right evidential relations, but radical conversion de-
pends upon how they view their evidence and epistemic principles, not 
on how someone else views them. It is the agent’s epistemic situation that 
is relevant, not ours.
6Bas van Fraassen, “Belief and the Problem of Ulysses and the Sirens,” Philosophical 
Studies 77 (1995), 7–37.
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There are other examples of radical conversion; Chihara gives an 
example in which someone radically changes their beliefs because of a 
newly thought of hypothesis.7 Chihara tells a story in which a suitor for 
a princess is given one number a day in something like a red ping-pong 
ball, for six days. On the seventh day he is required to guess what number 
he will be given; if correct he wins the princess and half the kingdom, but 
if wrong he is put to death. The first number is 47, but unfortunately after 
six days he can discern no pattern which would indicate to him what the 
seventh number is likely to be, and the new evidence hasn’t given him 
much reason to change his initial probabilities. While thinking about the 
crimson color of the king’s flag, suddenly “something clicks in his head”:
The balls are crimson! “Crimson” has seven letters. There are seven days 
in a week. Could the numbers be Gödel numbers spelling out “crimson”? 
The king’s logician has written a logic book. I saw it on the bookshelf. Here 
it is. Let’s see: what is 47 the Gödel number of? Eureka! It’s “c.” I’ll bet the 
seventh letter will be the Gödel number of “n,” that is, 69.8
Chihara points out that simply thinking of the new hypothesis radi-
cally changed the suitor’s probabilities and evidence relations, and the 
change was not due to any new evidence. The suitor had previously never 
considered the hypothesis that the numbers were the Gödel numbers of 
“crimson,” but once he thought of it, finding that 47 was the Gödel number 
of “c” greatly increased the probability that the seventh number would be 
69, the Gödel number of “n.” Chihara argues that even if the suitor had 
found out that 47 was the Gödel number of “c” before thinking of the 
new hypothesis, this would not have resulted in any change in thinking 
the last number was likely to be 69; without thinking of the new hypoth-
esis, the first number being the Gödel number of “c” didn’t mean much 
at all. Chihara presented his example as a counterexample to orthodox 
Bayesianism, which requires all change of belief be in accord with condi-
tionalization. Without going into the details of Bayesianism, we can say 
that rational change of belief is a function solely of the new evidence state-
ment and the old beliefs; thinking of new hypotheses plays no role in the 
theory.9 If the suitor were an orthodox Bayesian, this would be a case of 
7Charles S. Chihara, “Some Problems for Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” British Journal 
for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1987), 551–560.
8Ibid.,” 558.
9Otte attempts to accommodate Chihara’s example within Bayesianism, or any rule-based 
epistemology, by characterizing the thinking of the new hypothesis as new evidence. This 
allows radical conversion to be consistent with rule-based epistemologies, but does so by 
making the rule consistent with almost any belief change resulting from a new idea. Any 
rule that allows significant belief change based on coming up with a new idea will be a very 
permissive rule; very little will be ruled out by any such rule. In this way it is similar to the 
previously discussed view according to which seeming right always justifies belief change. 
Since most Bayesians do not allow thinking of new hypotheses to be new evidence, thinking 
of new ideas may result in cases of radical conversion for them. See Richard Otte, “A Solution 
to a Problem for Bayesian Confirmation Theory,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 
45 (1994), 764–769. 
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radical conversion, because the suitor changed his beliefs, but not because 
of acquiring any new evidence. According to the prior view, which does 
not include the new hypothesis, the suitor should not be confident that 
the seventh number will be 69. Holding 69 more likely than other num-
bers would be irrational. Chihara’s point is that simply thinking of a new 
idea can result in our changing our beliefs in ways that are not sanctioned 
by our old beliefs. We can view this as the new idea giving us a reason 
to think our old evidential relations among beliefs are in error. Chihara’s 
example shows that some cases of radical conversion are clearly rational; 
we can be rational even if we change beliefs in ways not sanctioned by our 
previous commitments.
Van Fraassen’s analysis of the problem of radical conversion in sci-
entific revolutions relies on the ambiguity of scientific language. van 
Fraassen argued that we can understand radical conversion by paying 
attention to how ambiguities are made clearer. We do not have time to 
discuss this in the detail it deserves, but ambiguities can be disambigu-
ated in different ways. van Fraassen’s idea is that in scientific revolutions 
the later view can be seen as disambiguating the language in such a way 
that the new paradigm is a rational continuation of the prior and the prior 
paradigm can be seen as a special case of the latter. From the later view, 
vagueness, incompleteness, and ambiguities were seen and made explicit, 
and this allows for a way to see the new theory as rationally continuous 
with the past.10 Suppose that an ambiguity in a concept results in theory 
T being ambiguous between T1 and T2. Evidence might be very unlikely 
on T, unlikely on T1, yet very likely on T2. Evidence may disconfirm T, 
yet confirm T2. A more fine-grained or disambiguated language may con-
tain evidential relations not contained in the less-detailed language. van 
Fraassen gives the example of mass, which illustrates ambiguities giving 
rise to different evidential relations. In Newtonian science, mass can be 
characterized as proper mass, inertial mass, or gravitational mass.11 These 
are different concepts, but because they coincide in the Newtonian frame-
work they were not clearly separated. A Newtonian thinking of mass as 
proper mass will think it absurd that mass varies with velocity, whereas 
Einstein pointed out that inertial mass varies with velocity. Ambiguities 
in the Newtonian framework excluded certain ideas that played a central 
role in a relativistic framework. van Fraassen says:
This example shows at least that the most precise language about nature 
we have, devised by the most precise of physical scientists, can harbor hid-
den ambiguities. Here we have the makings of one quick resolution of our 
dilemma. Conceptual revolutions bring such hidden ambiguities to light; or 
perhaps we should say, conceptual revolutions can occur when they come to 
light. So, is the posterior view unintelligible or demonstrably absurd to the 
10van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance, 114, 115, 151.
11Ibid., 113.
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prior? Yes, provided of course that demonstration is given in the ambiguous 
language of the past! But no, in the (retrospectively) disambiguated terms.12
In radical conversion our language or conceptual framework changes in a 
way that allows the change to be seen as rational.13 Although this handles 
many cases of radical conversion, it does not handle all; there may be cases 
of radical conversion in which the rationality of changing to the later view 
does not primarily depend on previous ambiguity.
Chihara showed that simply thinking of new ideas can result in radical 
conversion, and as a result of new ideas it is rational to rearrange and 
modify our previous beliefs. It is worth noting similarities between van 
Fraassen’s and Chihara’s accounts. For Chihara, thinking of a new hy-
pothesis brings a new concept or idea into the language, and with it we get 
a whole new set of evidential relations. For van Fraassen, disambiguation 
basically has the same effect. Disambiguating concepts can result in new 
evidential relations. In both accounts, our conceptual scheme is expanded 
in such a way that new evidential relations arise.
We have seen that there are cases of radical conversion, and some of 
these are clearly rational. In addition to van Fraassen’s and Chihara’s ex-
amples, in the example of religious experience we saw that the epistemic 
implications of having an experience may surprise us, and we may change 
our beliefs based on that. In general, cases of radical conversion are ones 
in which one comes to hold that one’s previous views about how belief 
should change were incorrect. In radical conversion, we hold that some of 
our previous beliefs were in error, perhaps because they were not sensi-
tive to ambiguities, perhaps because they did not account for new ideas, 
or perhaps because they did not adequately account for experience. From 
the later point of view, we were earlier in an impoverished epistemic situ-
ation, and in radical conversion we correct that error. Our later views are 
not continuous with our previous ones because we hold the previous ones 
were in error. We will now use these ideas about radical conversion to 
compare the thought of Kierkegaard and Plantinga, focussing on their 
ideas about religious conversion.
Kierkegaard
[T]he seeker must lack the truth right up until the moment he receives it; he 
cannot even possess it in the form of ignorance, because then the moment 
becomes merely an occasion. No, he cannot even be a seeker. This is how 
the problem must be characterized if we do not want to revert to a Socratic 
account. He must be defined as being outside the truth (not approaching it 
12Ibid., 114.
13This account of radical change also allows van Fraassen to account for cases in which the 
later theory retains the predictive power of the predecessor, which is common in scientific 
revolutions.
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as a proselyte, but going away from it), or as being in error. He is thus in a 
state of error.14
In Philosophical Crumbs Johannes Climacus expresses several ideas that re-
ject much of traditional epistemology and lead to a very different picture 
of our epistemic lives. According to Climacus, we are alienated from God, 
and we hold the doctrines of Christianity to be unreasonable, unlikely, or 
even absurd. An encounter with God can cause a change from this epis-
temic state to one where it is held that Christianity is reasonable and very 
likely to be true.15 This is a radical change in one’s epistemic life, and is not 
based on prior beliefs and evidence combined with standard logical and 
epistemic principles; instead, it is based on the passion of faith. As a result 
of this new passion, reason will now accept limits to its scope, whereas 
the contrary passion of offence will lead reason to not accept religious 
mysteries. Reason is not a neutral judge between these different epistemic 
positions, which are ultimately based on different passions; these differing 
passions result in the old and new epistemic states differing in basic and 
fundamental ways. Of course this is a very brief summary of some of the 
ideas that Climacus presents, and it is not intended to be anything near an 
adequate investigation into Climacus’s thought.
Climacus often says the doctrines of Christianity are preposterous, 
absurd, and refers to “the ultimate paradox.” The way to read these com-
ments of Climacus is very controversial. Although I do not here have 
time to argue for this position, I will follow the interpretation of Stephen 
Evans, who holds that Climacus is not claiming Christian doctrines are 
logically inconsistent or violate reason.16 According to Evans, “in saying 
Christianity is essentially paradoxical, Climacus is not committed to the 
claim that it is logically contradictory and therefore contrary to reason, 
but he is committed to the claim that it is something human reason can 
never master or comprehend.”17 Christianity may be incomprehensible 
without being contrary to reason. Furthermore, “Climacus . . . regularly 
uses the term ‘contradiction’ to refer to what might today be designated as 
an ‘incongruity,’ with formal logical contradictions seen as a species of the 
incongruous.”18 According to this view, in saying Christian doctrines are 
14Soren Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, trans. M. G. Piety (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press 2009), 92. 
15Characterizing Climacus as holding that Christian belief is probable in any sense is 
controversial. According to Climacus the believer will be certain of Christian belief and does 
not hold it to be merely probable. However, I am using the term “probable” somewhat dif-
ferently than Climacus, and holding something to be certain entails holding it to be highly 
probable, and in saying the believer holds Christianity to be very probable I am not claiming 
it is less than certain. I here merely characterize the believer’s epistemic state very generally, 
which may also be complicated by having to renew one’s faith. 
16Stephen Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992).
17Ibid., 89.
18Ibid., 100.
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absurd or preposterous, Climacus is claiming they are very improbable, 
not that they are logically inconsistent.
One of the most important ideas that Climacus brings up is the idea 
that there are fundamentally different epistemic positions, and these 
differ on what is reasonable to believe. Beliefs generally are not reasonable 
or unreasonable simpliciter, but are reasonable or unreasonable relative 
to the rest of one’s beliefs. When discussing whether it is reasonable to 
believe something, Climacus instructs us to ask from what perspective we 
are judging:
But is that which has been developed here conceivable? We will not be hasty 
in answering. . . . Before we reply, we must ask who it is who should answer 
the question. To be born, is that conceivable? Yes, why not; but to whom is 
it conceivable, one who has been born or one who has not been born? The 
latter is preposterous and could not have occurred to anyone, because he 
who has been born could never get such an idea. When he who has been 
born thinks of himself as having been born, he thinks of this transition from 
not being to being. This must also be the case with respect to rebirth. Or does 
it make the situation more difficult that the non-being that precedes rebirth 
contains more being than the non-being that precedes birth? But who can 
conceive of this? It must be he who is reborn, because it, would be preposter-
ous for one who had not been reborn to think it, and would it not be laugh-
able that such a thing could occur to him?19
Although Climacus is discussing who is able to conceive something, we 
can view the main point behind his use of “conceive” as being what it is 
reasonable to believe. That is why he equates being preposterous with 
being unable to conceive. Here Climacus is making the point, often made 
in twentieth-century discussions of scientific confirmation, that back-
ground beliefs are very important in assessing evidence and confirmation. 
A related point is that judgments of probability will also be relative to 
one’s other beliefs.
This allows us to better understand Climacus’s claim that Christian 
doctrines are improbable, and even “the most improbable.”20 Statements 
or propositions are not probable or improbable simpliciter, but are prob-
able relative to some set of beliefs. So Climacus’s claim is that Christian 
doctrines are very improbable relative to some set of beliefs; the natural 
question is, what set of beliefs or perspective is Christianity improbable 
with respect to? The obvious answer is that Climacus’s claim that Christian 
doctrines are improbable must be viewed as claiming Christian doctrines 
are improbable from the perspective of the unbeliever. One of Climacus’s 
most important points is that reason, like probability, depends on other 
personal factors, in ways we will explain shortly. When Climacus speaks 
of reason, it may appear as if he is speaking of something objective that 
is neutral and applies to all people. On the contrary, when speaking of 
19Kierkegaard, Repetition and Philosophical Crumbs, 97.
20Ibid., 123. 
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reason he often is referring to the perspective of the unbeliever; believers 
and nonbelievers will have different background beliefs and views about 
reason, and Climacus generally talks as if the perspective of the unbeliever 
is the default position. Christianity is improbable with respect to the belief 
systems held by non-Christians, but Climacus gives us no reason to think 
Christian doctrines are improbable for a Christian.
Let us now apply Kierkegaard’s thoughts to naturalism and Christi-
anity. Naturalism and Christianity give very different perspectives on 
many issues. Naturalists will generally claim the central doctrines of 
Christianity are very unlikely to be true; the idea of God, the incarnation, 
and other doctrines, are all held to be extremely unlikely. Christians, on 
the other hand, will think it very likely God exists, along with doctrines 
such as the incarnation, even if they do not understand them. Although 
naturalists and Christians may not go so far as to say the others are ir-
rational (this depends on their views about what it is to be rational and 
irrational), both will judge the central doctrines of the other position to be 
very unlikely, or preposterous, to use Climacus’s phrase. Each will hold 
that the others are not in good epistemic situations and hold beliefs that 
are highly unlikely.
Let us suppose that both naturalism and Christianity can be rationally 
held; there is no clear objective standard of rationality, such as consis-
tency, that either violates. The question that then arises is whether one can 
rationally reason from one of these positions to the other. Is there a way 
to reason that will lead a naturalist to become a Christian? Even if both 
naturalism and Christianity are rational to hold, it does not follow that 
there is a way to rationally change belief from one to the other based on 
reasoning. This is simply the question of whether ordinary conversion is 
possible, or whether all conversion must be radical conversion.
Climacus claims that Christianity is not the sort of religion we’d get 
if we relied on our reason; in effect, he is rejecting the whole project of 
natural theology. Climacus sees the non-Christian as not getting closer to 
the truth by reason, but as actually moving away from it:
To the extent that he was in error, he was constantly moving away from the 
truth, but in having received the condition in the moment, his course was 
altered, which is to say that he was turned around. Let us call this change 
conversion.21
It is not the case that rational non-Christians will get closer and closer to 
Christianity by reasoning; instead, using reason, they will always reject 
it as being unreasonable. Because of this, any change from one of these 
positions to the other is not a result of applying some neutral reasoning to 
available evidence. Conversion is a radical epistemic break with the past; 
Climacus even describes it as a rebirth, since it is like the transition from 
non-being to being. For Climacus, conversion is radical, not ordinary. But 
21Ibid., 92.
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this does not mean that in conversion we are irrational or epistemically ir-
responsible. A person who undergoes radical conversion does not believe 
what they know is false, nor do they become irrational; on the contrary, 
they simply hold their previous beliefs were in error, and are being re-
sponsible in correcting them.
Since conversion is radical, according to Climacus, the basis of conver-
sion is not reason, but passion. When confronted with the paradox of God 
incarnate, Climacus says we can respond with the passion of faith or the 
passion of offense. Conversion does not take place because of reasoning 
about some additional evidence, such as religious experience, but de-
pends on our passions. People could have the same evidence or religious 
experience, and yet differ wildly on the beliefs formed in response to that 
experience. In Climacus’s discussion of the case of the contemporary dis-
ciple, we find him dispelling the notion that more evidence is all that is 
needed to turn someone into a Christian. Contemporaries of Christ had 
lots of factual evidence, more than we could ever have, and yet that is not 
relevant to whether one becomes a Christian.22 Without the proper heart, 
no amount of evidence will bring about conversion. What matters in the 
case of conversion is having the appropriate passion, which Climacus 
calls faith. According to Evans, it is easy to miss Climacus’s point that 
reason depends on the passions: “From Climacus’s perspective, human 
reason is not a disinterested quest for a god-like view of things, but the 
expression of a very interested human being.”23 This does not mean that 
our beliefs are irrational, or that non-rational leaps or choices are the 
foundation of belief. Conversion is not the result of more evidence. What 
is needed is a change of heart, which results in radical conversion. Reason 
is passionate reason.
According to Climacus, the passion of faith accepts limits to reason, 
but the opposite passion of offence does not. Certainly the Christian will 
accept that many things about God are simply unknowable by us, in 
principle. However, it is equally true that anyone, including naturalists 
who have the passion of offence, must recognize the limits of reason. One 
result of twentieth-century logic and mathematics is that we now know 
that many mathematical statements are undecidable. For example, in 
1940 Kurt Gödel showed that we could not disprove the generalized con-
tinuum hypothesis within standard Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, and in 
1963 Paul Cohen showed that we could not prove it either; the generalized 
continuum hypothesis is undecidable. And even if we stick to empirical 
facts, there are facts that all will agree are unknowable; for example, facts 
about any possible states of the universe before the big bang, or facts too 
far away in space-time. And there are empirical facts not too far away that 
are practically unknowable; for example, this morning how many spins 
did a leaf from my apple tree make as it fell to the ground unobserved? 
22Ibid., chap. V. 
23Evans, Passionate Reason: Making Sense of Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, 61.
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But perhaps Climacus has in mind issues like the incarnation or whether 
God has a good reason to permit evil that we don’t know about. Many 
Christians are not worried by their inability to know God’s reason for per-
mitting evil; they hold that God’s ways are beyond our ways, and it is not 
surprising that we are unable to determine God’s reasons. Many natural-
ists are of the view that if God had a reason to permit evil we’d know what 
it was. This issue, and related issues in skeptical theism, are hotly debated 
today, and are the sort of issues that Climacus thinks depends on passion 
and not reason.
To summarize, according to Kierkegaard’s Climacus, people with dif-
ferent passions have fundamentally different epistemic frameworks. The 
passion of faith and the passion of offence lead to epistemological posi-
tions that result in different judgments of rationality and irrationality. The 
passion of offence results in viewing Christian doctrines as preposterous 
and irrational, whereas the passion of faith gives rise to viewing those doc-
trines as reasonable. On one view, unknowable religious mysteries are not 
problematic in the sense of being a sign of falseness or irrationality; reason 
is a limited tool, and we shouldn’t expect to comprehend everything. On 
the other view, the mysteries make it unlikely the beliefs are true, and it is 
irrational to accept them. The difference between these epistemic positions 
is not due to one of them having more or less evidence than the other; the 
difference is due to different passions, not different evidence. Given this, 
it is clear that according to Climacus any change from one position to the 
other must be a case of radical conversion; Climacus is clear that one is 
not going to become a Christian on the basis of evidence or reason. Pas-
sions, not reason nor evidence, enable us to see that our previous way of 
looking at things is in error, and give rise to a new set of beliefs. But even 
though radical conversion is brought about by passions, these changes 
are not irrational in any objective sense. Rationality and epistemic judg-
ments depend on the person and the epistemic situation. From the passion 
of offense, becoming a Christian is irrational, but from the standpoint of 
faith, the change moves one from a poor epistemic position to a good one. 
The appropriate passion helps us correct previous errors in judgment. We 
should not expect reason to do what it is unable to do.
Plantinga
Unlike Kierkegaard, Alvin Plantinga is one of the most influential analytic 
philosophers of religion. Throughout his career he has investigated the 
rational basis of religious belief, and has argued for the rationality of reli-
gious belief against various objections. Along with Wolterstorff, Plantinga 
was a main developer of what has come to be known as Reformed episte-
mology. In developing Reformed epistemology, Plantinga argues against 
evidentialism: “Evidentialism is the view that belief in God is rationally 
justifiable or acceptable only if there is good evidence for it, where good 
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evidence would be arguments from other propositions one knows.”24 In 
these discussions Plantinga limits the required evidence to propositional 
evidence, evidence that can be expressed by propositions: “This evidence 
would be propositional evidence: evidence from other propositions, and 
it would have to come in the form of arguments.”25 One motive for evi-
dentialism is what Plantinga calls classical foundationalism, which he 
characterizes as holding that in order for religious belief to be justified, it 
has to be basic (self-evident, evident to the senses, or incorrigible) or de-
rivable in some way from basic beliefs. Religious belief may be classified 
as irrational or absurd according to evidentialism and classical founda-
tionalism, because religious beliefs are not basic nor are they supported 
by basic beliefs. However, Plantinga rejects classical foundationalism and 
claims that many religious beliefs are basic for many rational people; thus 
these beliefs are justified without being supported by argument. Instead 
of being absurd, religious beliefs can be rational.
Theologians in the Reformed tradition are suspicious of natural the-
ology, and although his views have evolved, throughout Plantinga’s work 
we find him not looking to argument and natural theology to ground 
rational religious belief. Any argument for theism can be resisted by ra-
tional people, and there is no argument for the existence of God that all 
rational people must accept. Put another way, Plantinga and the Reformed 
tradition are very skeptical of positive apologetics, which is the attempt 
to prove some central tenets of the Christian religion. This is similar to 
Kier kegaard’s idea that one does not become a Christian by reasoning and 
evidence.
Although Plantinga is skeptical of arguments and propositional 
evidence for religious belief, this does not mean that he thinks religious 
belief is groundless, unwarranted, irrational, or without evidence. This 
is because Plantinga distinguishes between propositional and nonpropo-
sitional evidence, and he holds there can be nonpropositional evidence 
for religious belief, even if there is no propositional evidence. Plantinga 
argues we have a cognitive faculty, which following Calvin he calls the 
sensus divinitatis, that produces religious beliefs in various circumstances. 
For example, when I look at the Grand Canyon or a majestic mountain 
range, the sensus divinitatis may produce in me the belief that God is 
glorious. What is important is that although the resulting religious beliefs 
are not based on propositional evidence, they are supported by a form 
of nonpropositional evidence. We do not need propositional evidence to 
support belief in God, because we have nonpropositional evidence; it is 
this nonpropositional evidence that supplies warrant and results in reli-
gious belief being rational. In contrast to evidentialism, Plantinga holds 
that religious belief can be warranted and rational without being based on 
propositional evidence.
24Alvin Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 70.
25Ibid.. 
175KIERKEGAARD AND PLANTINGA ON RADICAL CONVERSION
Kierkegaard also recognized the importance of nonpropositional evi-
dence and argued that understanding cannot be reduced to understanding 
propositions. In Fear and Trembling he says: “Even if one were able to con-
vert the whole content of faith into conceptual form, it does not follow 
that one has comprehended faith, comprehended how one entered into it 
or how it entered into one.”26 Without the proper passions we may be able 
to have a certain intellectual understanding of Christianity, but we won’t 
understand what it means to be a Christian. Rational decisions and beliefs 
are based upon much more than our beliefs about certain propositions.
In Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga applied his more fully devel-
oped epistemological ideas to Christian belief. According to Plantinga, a 
very rough characterization of warrant is that a belief is warranted if it is 
formed by a properly functioning cognitive faculty that is aimed at truth 
in an appropriate environment. Thus, warranted beliefs are the result of 
properly functioning cognitive faculties. A consequence of this is that re-
ligious beliefs produced by the sensus divinitatis are warranted if God 
exists. The reason for this is that God gave us the sensus divinitatis in 
order that we might have true beliefs about him; when working properly 
in an appropriate environment, it will lead to true beliefs about God. God 
has given us a cognitive faculty that can reliably produce beliefs about 
him, and thus beliefs based on this faculty are warranted and rational.
It is worth noting that Plantinga views the sensus divinitatis as one 
of our standard cognitive faculties. In general, beliefs produced by our 
cognitive faculties are not based on evidence or argument, but are still 
considered to be part of the deliverances of reason. For example, ac-
cording to Plantinga the deliverances of reason include, among others, 
the results of cognitive faculties that produce a priori beliefs, beliefs about 
the external world, and memory beliefs. Since the sensus divinitatis is a 
natural cognitive faculty, the beliefs it produces can be said to be part of 
the deliverances of reason:
[A] capacity to apprehend God’s existence is as much a part of our natural 
noetic equipment as is the capacity to apprehend perceptual truths, truths 
about the past, and truths about other minds. Belief in the existence of God 
is in the same boat as belief in other minds, the past, and perceptual objects; 
in each case God has so constructed us that in the right circumstances we 
form the belief in question. But then the belief that there is such a person as 
God is as much among the deliverances of reason as those other beliefs.27
Belief in God is based on reason, and is not a baseless or an arbitrary leap 
without evidence.
According to Plantinga’s model, as a result of nonpropositional evi-
dence, belief in God could be warranted for some and not warranted for 
26Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, trans. Sylvia Walsh, ed. Stephen Evans and 
Sylvia Walsh (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 5. 
27Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality, ed. A. Plantinga 
and N. Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 90.
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others, even though they have the same propositional evidence. The sensus 
divinitatis works to various degrees in different people; in some it may 
work well, and in others it may not work at all. Some will have a properly 
functioning sensus divinitatis, resulting in warranted belief in God, while 
those whose sensus divinitatis is not working may have no rational reason 
to form belief in God. Plantinga also argues that if God exists, belief in 
God can be warranted (and will be warranted in the case where the rel-
evant faculty is working properly in the right circumstances), whereas if 
God does not exist, it probably is not warranted. Thus one’s view about 
the warrant and rationality of religious belief will depend on whether one 
thinks God exists. From some epistemic situations or perspectives, reli-
gious belief will be warranted and rational, yet other epistemic situations 
will judge it irrational. This coincides nicely with Kierkegaard’s view that 
when assessing the rationality of a belief we need to ask from whose per-
spective we are judging. Plantinga and Kierkegaard appear to agree that 
religious belief will be irrational or unreasonable from the perspective of 
the non-religious, but rational from the perspective of a Christian.
In spite of this agreement, it appears that Plantinga’s views about 
the reasonableness or justification of religious belief are quite different 
from those of Kierkegaard’s Johannes Climacus. Although Climacus and 
Plantinga both agree that religious belief is reasonable from the perspec-
tive of a religious person, they differ on why this is so. Plantinga says a 
person with a properly functioning sensus divinitatis will have religious 
beliefs that are based on reason; Climacus says differing passions instead 
of differing cognitive faculties account for the different religious beliefs. 
Plantinga gives us an account of reason which applies to both believers 
and non-believers; if the sensus divinitatis is not working in non-believers, 
they are in the unfortunate situation of lacking a cognitive faculty that 
believers have; they are cognitively hindered, and don’t have the full 
complement of operating cognitive faculties that humans are supposed to 
have. Thus their lack of belief is understandable because it is simply a case 
of them having to form beliefs without some of their faculties of reason 
working correctly. In contrast to this, Climacus does not account for the 
differences between them by the non-believers being cognitively deprived; 
the difference between believers and non-believers is not due to different 
evidence, propositional or nonpropositional, but is due to different pas-
sions. For example, Climacus writes that the contemporary disciple had 
no real advantage over us, even though they could see and experience 
life with Jesus on a daily basis. These contemporaries had an enormous 
amount of nonpropositional evidence about Jesus, but this does not pro-
duce faith. According to Climacus, the difference between the believer 
and non-believer is not ultimately based on evidence; thus he would reject 
Plantinga’s view that the difference between believer and non-believer is 
due to nonpropositional evidence. Differences in reasoning are not the 
basis of the difference between them. Climacus gives us a very different 
picture, one in which the passions move us from the one epistemic state 
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to the other. Climacus does not give us an account of nonpropositional 
evidence, and for him radical conversion is not based on reason.28 This 
does not mean it is unreasonable, because there is a difference between 
being beyond reason and being contrary to reason. For Climacus, reason 
is not always suited to neutrally choose between positions; reason always 
works within a framework or perspective. To go beyond that framework, 
one needs the passions.
Plantinga does not specifically discuss the issue of radical conversion. 
Since Plantinga usually uses the term “evidence” to refer only to propo-
sitional evidence, and much belief change is based on nonpropositional 
evidence, there will be many cases in which rational belief change is not 
a function of the previous beliefs and new evidence. Many belief changes 
typically involve nonpropositional evidence, and there is no way to reason 
to the new beliefs from the old using propositional evidence. However, 
these belief changes are based on reason, since they are the result of non-
propositional evidence. This indicates that in discussing Plantinga and 
radical conversion we should not use the term “evidence” to refer only to 
propositional evidence, and should use it in a broader sense that includes 
nonpropositional evidence. Plantinga claims that if we take “evidence” 
broadly, so that it includes doxastic evidence, then belief is always on the 
basis of evidence.29
However, even if we construe “evidence” broadly, there remains the 
issue of whether religious conversion is rational according to one’s pre-
vious perspective; the issue of radical conversion is not settled by noting 
that beliefs are all based on evidence, broadly construed. Earlier we 
discussed how evidential relations are relative to a perspective or epis-
temic framework, and the later perspective seeing the religious beliefs as 
based on evidence does not imply that the earlier view will consider the 
conversion to be rational and based on evidence. In discussing Plantinga 
and radical conversion we should not focus on the term “evidence” and 
should instead characterize it in terms of whether the belief change is ra-
tional from the prior point of view. But before we discuss this, we need 
to first look at Plantinga’s view of the passions, since for Kierkegaard it 
was the role of the passions in epistemology that brought about radical 
conversion.
A Deeper Agreement
So initially it looks as if Plantinga and Kierkegaard’s Climacus view the 
basis of religious belief very differently; for Plantinga it is part of the de-
liverances of reason based on a cognitive faculty, and for Climacus it is 
based on passion. But this initial appearance of difference is deceiving. In 
28Of course, it is consistent with this position that as a result of the passions moving one 
to a new epistemic situation, one then has nonpropositional evidence that previously was 
lacking. 
29Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 
192.
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chapter 9 of Warranted Christian Belief, Plantinga discusses the relation of 
affection to the model of religious belief he presented. Although Plantinga 
does not discuss the relation between the sensus divinitatis and affections, 
he notes that there are two ways we can view the relation between beliefs 
produced by the Holy Spirit and our wills.
What is the relation between affection and belief here, between will and in-
tellect? Which, if either, is primary? Is it that first one sees (i.e., comes to 
know or believe) that the great things of the gospel and God himself are 
lovely and amiable, and then comes to love them? Or is it rather that first 
one comes to love them, thus coming to see that the things in question are, 
indeed, worthy of love?30
Basically, we can view a change in affections as being based on a change in 
what we believe, or we can view what we believe as being affected by our 
affections. After much interesting discussion, Plantinga appears to think 
that neither the affections nor belief is primary, and both are dependent 
on each other:
There are certain things you won’t know unless you love, have the right 
affections; there are certain affections you won’t have without perceiving 
some of God’s moral qualities; neither perceiving nor affection can be said 
to be prior to the other.31
Although a detailed discussion of how affection affects belief is beyond 
the scope of this paper, it is clear that having certain affections can blind 
us and prevent us from forming the beliefs we should. But in addition 
to this negative influence, the affections often function in a positive way. 
There are many cases where having the appropriate affections is necessary 
for holding certain beliefs; if we hold the wrong affections, we’ll hold the 
wrong beliefs. One reason for this is that belief is not simply a passive af-
fair, and affections can lead us to pay closer attention than we would have 
had we lacked the affections. For example, loving or hating someone may 
lead us to pay more attention to them than we would if we were indifferent 
towards them. With regards to religious beliefs, love of God may make us 
much more likely to accept certain beliefs, such as the Christian story. 
Plantinga has pointed out that it is unlikely that we will believe things 
such as that God is worthy of our love and worship, or that it is proper to 
love God, unless we do love him. So we see that without the appropriate 
affections our reason may not work the way it was designed to work. Even 
if our cognitive faculties are designed to produce certain religious beliefs 
in certain circumstances, they will not function properly if we do not have 
the right affections. Since Plantinga thinks neither reason nor the affec-
tions are more fundamental than the other, both our reason and affections 
must change in order for there to be conversion. Without the appropriate 
affections, any nonpropositional evidence will be ineffectual.
30Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief , 295.
31Ibid., 303–304.
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We can now return to the topic of radical conversion. There are at least 
two ways the sensus divinitatis may fail to produce religious beliefs. In 
one type of case the sensus divinitatis may simply not operate correctly, 
and as a result these people may not believe because they lack the non-
propositional evidence for the religious beliefs. They may even say they 
would believe if they had an operating sensus divinitatis. If conversion 
occurs here it would be ordinary, not radical, because the prior epistemic 
state supported conversion given the evidence provided by an operating 
sensus divinitatis. In these cases people fail to believe because they lack 
certain nonpropositional evidence, but they agree it would be reasonable 
to believe if they had that evidence.
But there are other ways the sensus divinitatis may be ineffectual that 
are very different from the above situation. Recall that both proper affec-
tions and a properly functioning sensus divinitatis are required to have 
faith. This raises the possibility of a lack of faith being due to improper 
affections instead of a malfunctioning sensus divinitatis. Some may judge 
it unreasonable to hold religious beliefs, even if their sensus divinitatis is 
functioning properly. Having the wrong affections may result in holding 
that reason requires us to ignore the sensus divinitatis, and to consider 
any nonpropositional evidence associated with it to be misleading. A clear 
example of this is given by Thomas Nagel. Nagel writes:
My instinctively atheistic perspective implies that if I ever found myself 
flooded with the conviction that what the Nicene Creed says is true, the 
most likely explanation would be that I was losing my mind, not that I was 
being granted the gift of faith. From Plantinga’s point of view, by contrast, 
I suffer from a kind of spiritual blindness from which I am unwilling to be 
cured. This is a huge epistemological gulf, and it cannot be overcome by the 
cooperative employment of the cognitive faculties that we share, as is the 
hope with scientific disagreements.32
In this passage Nagel indicates that even if he had the sort of doxastic 
evidence provided by the sensus divinitatis, he would judge the religious 
beliefs unreasonable. Nagel thinks it would not be right for him to form 
religious beliefs based on the sort of evidence the sensus divinitatis gives, 
and his epistemic views prevent him from forming religious beliefs on the 
basis of the sensus divinitatis.
Now suppose that the sensus divinitatis operates in Nagel and he goes 
against his previous commitments and becomes a Christian, believing the 
Nicene Creed. This is warranted on Plantinga’s model, even though these 
beliefs are unreasonable from Nagel’s previous perspective. Clearly this 
would be a case of radical conversion, because Nagel’s new religious be-
liefs would be unreasonable from the perspective of his old beliefs, even 
given the new nonpropositional evidence. We thus see that because the 
32Thomas Nagel, “A Philosopher Defends Religion,” review of Where the Conflict Really 
Lies, by Alvin Plantinga, New York Review of Books, September 27, 2012, http://www.nybooks 
.com/articles/archives/2012/sep/27/philosopher-defends-religion/.
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affections play a fundamental role in Plantinga’s epistemology, as they do 
in Kierkegaard’s, instances of radical conversion will be rational.
The relation between the affections and the passions is not clear, and 
many identify them and use the terms interchangeably. I think it very 
plausible that Kierkegaard and Plantinga are talking about the same thing 
when they use the terms “passions” and “affections.” Given this, we see 
that Plantinga’s position is very similar to that of Kierkegaard’s Climacus; 
both hold that our affections or passions play a fundamental role in what 
we believe. So in spite of it looking as if Plantinga and Kierkegaard’s 
Climacus have radically different views about the basis of religious belief, 
it turns out that initial appearances are deceptive and their views have 
much in common. The difference between Plantinga and Climacus may 
be more a difference in emphasis than a substantive difference. Plantinga 
thinks that neither reason nor affection is more basic than the other; if we 
lack either the proper affections or the proper beliefs, we will lack faith. 
Throughout Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga tended to focus on how 
religious belief could be warranted. Although he discussed the affections, 
this was not emphasized as much as belief formation. In contrast to this, 
Climacus emphasized the role of the passions in conversion. Climacus is 
clear that without the appropriate passion we will lack faith, but he says 
little about the basis of the passion of faith. Evans argues that “it is clear 
that Kierkegaard does think therefore that to be a Christian one must be-
lieve certain things. He simply does not think that those beliefs can be held 
in a detached, intellectual manner.”33 In his discussion of responding to 
the moment, Climacus focusses on the passion of faith instead of our mind 
coming to see things differently. Thus we see that even though they may 
emphasize different aspects of conversion, the important thing is that both 
Plantinga and Kierkegaard realize that our passions and affections play a 
crucial role in radical conversion.34
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